Emerging Market economies have experienced periods of gradual and persistent appreciation in the real exchange rate, persistent current account deficits alongside high levels of foreign investment flows in an expansion phase followed by a contractionary phase of a sharp downward correction in the real exchange rate and sharp reversals in foreign investment flows. We introduce a natural search friction into the foreign investment decision in a small open economy and demonstrate that this can explain both the period of prolonged real appreciation and the asymmetrically sharp downward adjustment in the correction phase. The adjustment hazard model of investment we present generates predictions that differ significantly from the standard q model of investment with quadratic adjustment costs.
Introduction
The lending boom and real exchange rate appreciation episodes of emerging market economies in the nineteen nineties is a topic of extensive empirical and theoretical research. The empirical stylized facts of this phenomenon (Calvo-Leiderman-Reinhart (1996) , Rebelo-Vegh * I am especially thankful to Ben Bernanke, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Wojciech Olszewski and Kenneth Rogoff for their advice on this paper.
All remaining errors are my own. (1995), Calvo-Reinhart (1999) , Glick (1998) ) document a period of gradual and persistent appreciation in the real exchange rate with inflationary trends in the non-traded sector prices, a consumption boom and current account deficits accompanying unprecedented high levels of foreign investment flows, in the expansion phase. In several cases this is followed by a contractionary phase of a sharp downward correction in non-traded sector prices and the real exchange rate and sharp reversals in foreign investment flows 1 . This paper presents a theoretical framework that can explain both the period of prolonged real appreciation in the expansion phase and the asymmetrically sharp downward adjustment in the correction phase. The model describes a micro-foundation based adjustment friction in foreign investment flows and the predictions for foreign investment flows differ significantly from the standard q model of investment with quadratic adjustment costs.
We describe a small open economy with return seeking foreign investment flows. The source of friction in these flows emerges from information imperfections about investment returns in the emerging markets. Investment 'projects' are characterized by idiosyncratic returns that evolve stochastically over time and the type of the project can be determined only through a costly search process. The decision to invest, accordingly, weighs the return from a current project against the outside option and the option value of further search.
The decision to exit takes into account these two option values and the cost of exit. The endogenously determined entry decision and exit decision for the foreign investor generates dynamics in the path of foreign investment flows that in turn generate the responses of real exchange rate and current account that has been observed for emerging market economies.
Our model is distinct from the earlier literature in that it incorporates the direct economic effects of investment seeking capital flows, generates exit (reversals) of capital flows and asymmetry in the adjustment process that is observed in these economies. The theoretical literature can be broadly divided into two strands of explanations. One set of explanations rely on the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism to obtain dynamics in the current account and real exchange rate. Several papers (Calvo-Vegh (1993) ) that model exchange rate based stabilization programs that are imperfectly credible rely on this mechanism. Since the empirical evidence on intertemporal substitution is weak, Rebelo-Vegh (1995) who survey explanations based on exchange rate based stabilizations in high inflation economies conclude that it is "very difficult to explain the magnitude of the real appreciation and consumption booms" on the basis of these explanations. Moreover, these papers do not address the asymmetric adjustment that we observe. In more recent work, Calvo-Mendoza (2000) and Mendoza (2001) combine this mechanism with an 'occasionally binding' credit constraint to generate 'sudden stops' when fundamentals deteriorate.
We describe a mechanism where symmetric shocks to fundamentals generate asymmetric responses even when the constraint (adjustment friction) is always effective. Moreover, capital flows are shown to exit the economy in addition to a sudden stop. A second strand of the literature extends the Kiyotaki-Moore credit-cycle mechanism to generate dynamics in the real exchange rate. In Aghion-Bachetta-Banerjee (1999), the non-traded good serves both as a collateral and as an input for production generating equilibria with endogenous cycles in the relative price of non-traded goods and investment. Tornell-Schneider (2000) combine bailout guarantees with the credit cycle mechanism to generate self-fulfilling boom-bust phenomena. Both these papers however do not address the asymmetry of the adjustment process 2 .
The application of search theory to investment is uncommon in the literature. However, it seems natural to consider search frictions in foreign investment. The mechanism described has the following features. Foreign capital seeks high return investment projects in an emerging market. These investors lend to projects that engage in real activity in the emerging market and generate a random stream of returns for the investor. Foreign
Investors are constrained in their investment decisions by the need to determine the idiosyncratic type of the project through a costly evaluation process and face an endogenously determined adjustment hazard. As long as exit from a project is not costless to the investor, she has an incentive to search for a project with high idiosyncratic returns and investment decisions will incorporate the option value to waiting. The domestic households benefit from the higher income earned through supplying resources to the projects. With the idiosyncratic type of the project evolving stochastically over time there will be endogenous exit by investors in response to bad type-specific shocks and this negatively effects the level of activity of the project. At any point in time we therefore observe both so called 'investment creation' when new projects get activated with foreign investment and 'investment destruction' when foreign investors withdraw investments from projects 3 . The current account is determined both by the intertemporal consumption-saving decision of households and the dynamics of foreign investment flows. The prolonged appreciation in the real exchange rate, in response to an improvement in investment fundamentals is a consequence of the optimal decisions of investors to wait and seek good matches. On the other hand, in response to a deterioration in fundamentals, previously good matches now provide inadequate returns and one observes sharp reversals in investment flows, which in turn has a sharp negative effect on the real exchange rate and the activity of the non-traded sector 4 .
The model of investment flows we present can be viewed as an 'adjustment hazard' model of investment flows across borders. It is therefore useful to compare it with the standard work-horse model of adjustment dynamics in investment-the quadratic adjustment cost q model of investment. Our approach separates the gross flows underlying the net investment level and looks separately at the creation and destruction decisions. This separation makes 3 In the case of capital flows, destruction could refer to the sale of equity by foreign investors and its primary implication is a change of ownership. This change in ownership is also assumed to have a negative effect on the real activity of the project. While we use the term destruction here, the notion of destruction is not quite the same as in the labor literature. 4 In our model contractions follow from a change in fundamentals. Consequently, we do not argue for endogenous contractions.
important predictions for the adjustment path of net investment flows. Symmetric positive and negative shocks generate asymmetric responses in the adjustment path of net investment flows. In the standard q model the adjustment is symmetric 56 . In the case of emerging market economies, with investment flows demonstrating asymmetrically sharp reversals in crisis periods, our framework appears to perform better in matching the data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In 
The Model
The model describes a small open-economy with two types of agents-the domestic household and the foreign investor. We describe the latter in Section 2.1 and the former in Section 2.2. There are two types of goods -a traded good (t) and a non-traded (nt) good. The tradable good is treated as the numeraire. The price of the non-tradable good in terms of the traded good is p.
The Foreign Investor
Investment opportunities in the small open-economy are characterized by 'projects' that can include existing domestic firms, or new ventures, that benefit from foreign investment.
A typical risk-neutral foreign investor who invests (lends) a unit (a normalization) level of investment, denominated in terms of the traded good, in a project, is entitled to a random stream of returns, also in terms of traded goods, in all future periods during which the investor chooses to stay with the project. These projects engage in real activity by renting 5 The response to a positive shock is similar in the two frameworks. 6 Caballero (1997) and Caballer-Engel (1998) have a series of papers on a more general q model in which they assume asymmetric stochastic adjustment cost functions. Our model derives the stochastic adjustment process based on a specific friction in the investment process and therefore is micro-founded.
domestic resources and producing traded goods. We assume that there is a fixed bundle of traded and non-traded inputs that are hired each period, as long as the project is active.
The cost of this bundle of inputs varies with p t . Foreign investment is assumed to be essential to the firm remaining active. We take this assumption to the extreme and assume that the project becomes completely inactive when the foreign investor decides to withdraw her investment 7 .
The per-period return from a project, π (θ; z, p t ) is a function of an idiosyncratic component θ, a component z that reflects the aggregate state of the economy and the relative price of non-traded goods p t . The type of a project is identified by θ and each period θ evolves stochastically as a random draw from a distribution
. For now we assume that these draws are independently and identically distributed across all project types and over time 8 .
is additively separable in p , θ and z and linear in θ; π θ (θ; z t , p t ) = 1 (ii) π (θ; z t , p t ) is strictly increasing in θ and z, strictly decreasing in p, and continuously differentiable in θ, z and p.
Assumption 2.2:
The distribution function G(θ) is continuous in θ over the interval
The value of a type θ asset to an investor at time t, R t (θ; z t , p t ) will then evolve as follows,
The asset value will incorporate the possibility that the investor will choose to withdraw her investment in the future. In the event that she exits the project, her expected return is
Here ϕ represents the cost of withdrawing from a project and c is the search cost. For instance, when an investor chooses to sell an investment type that is hit by a 7 This extreme assumption is not necessary for the results we derive. All we require is that there is some negative effect of the withdrawal of foreign investment on the real activity of the project. 8 We will introduce persistence in Section 5.
poor idiosyncratic shock, she may have to sell it at a discount. V t represents the value to an investor of being in an 'un-invested' state at time t (described below). We have normalized the outside option (the option of not investing in the emerging market) for the foreign investor to zero. An investor will be indifferent between exiting a project and staying in a project as long as the value from exiting (V t − c − ϕ) and from staying, R t (b t ; z t , p t ), are equal. There is an optimal cut-off exit condition, b t, such that foreign agents will disinvest all projects of type θ < b t and retain their investment in all types θ ≥ b t . In every period the investor observes z and θ prior to making the decision to exit or stay. The exit condition is then given by,
An investor is assumed to enter the pool of searchers in the same period that she exits.
(2.1.1) can then be expressed as
An un-invested foreign investor is faced with heterogeneous investment opportunities, characterized by an initial distribution F (θ). The assumption is that foreign investors cannot costlessly determine the return type of an asset. Every period they draw a particular project and determine its type after incurring a cost c (and a one-period evaluation process). If they choose to invest in the asset they obtain R t (θ; z t , p t ) and if they choose to continue searching their expected return (net of cost c) is V t+1 . Foreign investment is however not frictionless due to the presence of information imperfections. This assumption is finding empirical support in recent literature on the determinants of capital flows across borders (Ghosh-Wolf (1999), Portes-Rey (2000)) 9 . The imperfection in information is modeled here 9 Portes-Rey (2000) conclude, from an empirical study, that the geography of information is a crucial determinant of the pattern of international transactions as investors facing a distribution of projects, F (θ). All foreign investors are otherwise ex ante identical and have the same information about the economy.
Assumption 2.3:
The initial distribution function F (θ) is continuous in θ over the
The expected value from rejecting a project and searching one more period is then V t −c, which we call the option value of search.
The return from accepting a project in period t is R t (θ; z t , p t ) and the expected value today of searching again next period is δ (V t+1 − c) . An investor will be indifferent between accepting a project and continuing to search when the two are equal. It follows from
does not depend on θ t , it is clearly the case that the optimal strategy of an investor will determine a cut-off value for θ in period t, a t . The entry cut-off condition is then,
The value function, V t , can then be written as
As long as δ(V t+1 − c) > 0 there will be an interior equilibrium wherein investors will decide to reject certain projects in anticipation of finding higher return projects in the future. 10 If we are willing to assume that the pool of foreign investors who seek projects in the emerging market is small relative to the pool of available and potential projects and that new projects emerge over time then this assumption is not restrictive. If we allow for the available distribution of projects to deteriorate over time as investors accept projects then there is less of an incentive to wait and more investment will take place early on. In Gopinath and Olzewski (1999) we allow for the distribution of returns to change endogenously over time. This generates multiple equilibria along the dynamic path.
For it to be true that there will be waiting by some investors in equilibrium, we require two conditions to be hold. The first is an important assumption that requires that the supply of foreign investment into an emerging market economy is restricted. That is, that there is not sufficent entry of foreign money into the economy to drive the return of the marginal investment project to the outside option (which is zero in our case). This assumption should not be hard to defend given the general consensus that capital flows across borders is far from perfect. There are several explanations such as portfolio diversification reasons, home bias etc. that prevents foreign capital from exploiting all potential investment opportunities in an emerging market. The second assumption is that of costly exit, as we described earlier.
Otherwise there will be no incentive to delay the investment decision.
In the presence of search, the marginal q, defined as the marginal valuation of investing a unit of capital, is equal to the difference between a naive net present value calculation and the call option of further search 11
Equation (2.1.7) indicates that the marginal valuation of investing is adjusted negatively for the foregone option of finding more remunerative projects in the future and adjusted positively for the savings in additional search costs that would have to be otherwise incurred.
Clearly, this differs from a naive net present value rule, which compares R t (θ; z t , p t ) 12 with 0 (the outside option). In the case when the call option is positive, investors will be more selective of their investments. 11 In deriving this expression, we impose the condition that
Given that V t+j is non explosive, this term tends to zero. 12 R t (θ; z t , p t ) is the return net of initial investment cost.
The adjustment hazard for an individual investor is represented by (1 − F (a t )). That is, with a probability of (1 − F (a t )) the investor will expect to successfully invest. Since a t is a forward looking variable, the adjustment hazard term incorporates information from the expected future path of prices and returns.
We assume that there is a fixed pool of foreign investors of measure one that seeks investment opportunities in the emerging economy 13 . We define η s to be the measure of investors un-invested and seeking investment projects at time s. This will include the pool of investors who are unsuccesful in finding an acceptable match in earlier periods,
and who continue to search and the pool of investors who disinvest and enter the pool of searchers in the same period.
The measure of projects that continue to be 'active' from period t − 1, m t , evolves as,
m t is predetermined at time t. It includes all active projects in period t − 1 that realized an idiosyncratic return sufficient to retain the foreign investment, (1 − G(b t−1 )) m t−1 , and all new matches that turned into active projects, η t−1 (1 − F (a t−1 )). Given that there is a fixed total pool of investment seekers of measure one, the relation between the measure of searching investors and active projects is given by
The level of what we shall call investment creation at any point of time is then, IC t = R θ * a t η t dF (θ) and the so-called level of investment destruction is ID t = R b t 0 m t dG(θ). Net investment is the difference between creation and destruction.
The Domestic Household
The domestic economy is comprised of identical infinitely lived households and the measure of these households is normalized to one. Households consume both traded and non-traded goods. They also produce non-traded goods Y n , which they supply in a perfectly competitive market. They are endowed with a fixed amount of traded goods,Ȳ t every period.
Households consume a fraction of Y n and sell the remaining fraction to foreign investors who start new projects. They can also borrow and lend (B) at the fixed world interest rate r (paid in terms of tradables) 14 In this framework, there is only firm level uncertainty but no aggregate uncertainty.
That is, all aggregate variables evolve deterministically. 15 .
The representative household maximizes a life-time utility function of the form
subject to the following flow budget constraint.
We assume a specific functional form for
Each period the household chooses C t,t , C n,t , Y n,t and B t+1 where C t,t is the consumption of traded goods at time t and C n,t is the consumption of non-traded goods at time t. 
Household optimization then requires that the following first-order conditions hold.
We assume that (1 + r) β = 1, which provides us with the condition for perfect consumption smoothing in traded goods, C t,t = C t,t+1 . The optimal choice of C n,t implies
Equation (2.2.6) is the equilibrium condition for intra-temporal allocation between traded and non-traded goods. Finally, the optimal choice of Y n,t implies
The marginal cost of producing another unit of the non-traded good, κY n,t, should equal the marginal benefit,
. Optimization also requires that the household exhaust its intertemporal budget constraint looking forward from every date t which in turn implies that (2.2.2) should hold as a strict equality.
Lastly, we have the goods-market clearing condition for non-traded goods,
(where we have normalized the demand by a foreign investor for the non-traded good to a unit.)
The real exchange rate, e, is defined as the ratio of the home consumption-based price index (P ) 16 to the rest-of-the-world price index (P * ) , e t =
In a small open economy p * t is taken as given, at every date t. The behavior of the real exchange rate then mimics the behavior of the home price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods, p t .
The current account is then 17
Definition 1 A search equilibrium is a sequence of the household's decisions {C t,t, C n,t , Y n,t , B t+1 }, foreign investors decisions that determine {b t , a t , I t , V t } ,real exchange rate {p t }, the measure of searching investors {η t } and active projects {m t }such that conditions (2.2.5)-(2.2.9) and (2.1.1-2.1.6) hold, given initial conditions {B 0 , M 0 } and exogenous state {z t , G (θ) , F (θ)}
The Economy in Steady State
The equilibrium equations can be written in the form Γ t+1 = g(Γ t , z t ) where Γ represents the vector of endogenous variables and the steady state is the solution to the equation
We solve for the steady state equilibrium as a function ofB 18 . The measure of 16 It can be shown that Pt =
(where we have assumed that preferences are the same in both countries). We have imposed the condition that there is purchasing power parity in tradables across countries. 17 We assume that all returns generated from the asset are repatriated to the foreign investors home country. 18 This is typical to open economy models where B is non-stationary. Refer Obstfeld-Rogoff (1996) . We could introduce the changes suggested in footnote 15, but this would not alter any of the main qualitative predictions of the model. active projects, m, is unchanging over time when the measure of newly activated projects, R θ * at η t dF (θ) that is formed by investment creation exactly offsets the measure of projects that exit following the realization of the idiosyncratic shock and investment destruction, R b t 0 m t dG(θ). That is,Ī = 0. While investment is zero, the measure of searching investors is still strictly positive. It can be shown that m = 1−F (a) 1−F (a)(1−G(b)) , and is therefore a decreasing function of the entry cut-off, a, and exit cut-off b. The more selective the investment and the higher the likelihood of exiting the market, the lower the measure of active projects in the economy.
In the long-run, the economy runs a trade deficit equal to the sum of income earned from active projects and interest receipts/payments,C t −Ȳ t = rB +pm 
respectively. A higher measure of active projects is associated with a more appreciated real exchange rate and higher level of output of non-traded goods.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique steady state equilibrium with endogenous entry, a ∈ (0, θ * ) and exit b ∈ (0, θ * ) .
Proof. See Appendix A.1
In the proof we demonstrate that the equilibrium can be reduced to a triplet {a, b, p} .
From the investors decision problem, a higher relative price of non-traded goods will correspond to greater selectivity in investment and higher exit. From the market clearing condition for non-traded goods we derive a negative relation between a and p. That is, when investors are more selective, it corresponds to a lower equilibrium price for non-traded goods. The two conditions together provide a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (i)
In an economy with a higher aggregate state, z, the adjustment hazard rate, (1−F (a t )), is higher and the probability of reversals, G(b t ), in investment is lower; the real exchange rate is more appreciated.
(ii) When the exit cost, ϕ, is higher, the adjustment hazard rate falls and the effect on the real exchange rate is ambiguous. 19 .
Proof. See Appendix A.2
When aggregate returns are higher, a searching investor would be willing to accept a project with a lower idiosyncratic return. The asset value of the previously marginal project is now higher. The expected return from search is also higher, as the change in z is permanent. The rise in the asset value of the marginal project is shown to be greater than the rise in the search option and this implies a decline in the idiosyncratic type of the marginal acceptable project. Consequently, more projects get accepted. By a similar argument, b is lower and exit probabilities fall. With a larger measure of active projects the demand for domestic resources rises, pushing up the real exchange rate. In the case when ϕ is higher, the effect on p is ambiguous. A higher ϕ makes exit more difficult. However, entering investors will take this into account when deciding to enter the market and will therefore become more selective.
Inertia in the Real Exchange Rate
Several of the Latin American economies that exhibited the lending boom-real exchange rate appreciation phenomenon we analyze were open to foreign investment flows prior to the nineteen nineties. The stimulus behind the increased private capital flows to these economies has been attributed to a lower outside option, with lower returns on U.S stocks 19 Note that it is possible to solve for the long-run change inB only after taking into account the short-run response of B which we leave for later. For now, this comparative static ignores the wealth effect. In Section 4, we demonstrate that the wealth effect does not reverse our predictions.
(Calvo-Leiderman-Reinhardt (1993)) and to the pull factor of improved domestic investment conditions. We consider the adjustment response of an economy that is open to foreign investment flows when there is a one-time unanticipated permanent improvement in the aggregate state of the economy, z 20 . This could be a combination of worse outside options or improved domestic conditions. We restrict attention to one time changes so as to focus on the endogenous adjustment dynamics of the economy, separate from the exogenous shock process.
To solve for the dynamics, we log-linearize the model by taking a first order Taylor series approximation around an initial steady state. The log-linearized equations are derived in Appendix A.3. We use the notationx t ≡
wherex is the steady state value of x t . The system of equations can be reduced to a system of 5 variables {C t,t , B t+1 , b t , V t , m t } . In the general case, the stability of this system cannot be determined analytically and we employ In response to a positive stimulus to z, the entry cut-off declines as investors find lower idiosyncratic return projects acceptable. The adjustment hazard rate therefore increases.
More matches are acceptable. Similarly, the exit cut-off also falls and fewer investors leave the market. There is therefore more creation and less destruction. All adjustment however cannot take place immediately because of the search friction. Investors will match slowly over time and we observe strictly positive net investment along the transition path. Net investment rises and declines along the transition path. Interestingly, this is similar to the prediction of a quadratic adjustment cost model of investment. However, as we demonstrate ahead the prediction of this model differs significantly from the former in other respects.
The real exchange rate is determined by the relative price of non-traded goods. The 20 This is similar to a productivity improvement in the production of traded goods.
percentage deviation of the non-traded goods prices can be expressed aŝ
where dI s is the change in investment (Ī = 0), and χ 1 = ¡Ȳ n +C n ¢ −1 . SinceĈ T,t adjusts immediately to its long-run level (equation 2.2.5), the transition dynamics in the RER is determined by the evolution of net investment flows and the measure of active projects.
As more projects get activated, the demand for traded and non-traded goods rise. In a small open economy, with a perfectly elastic supply of traded goods, the increased demand for resources will result in an increase in the relative price of non-traded goods. The real exchange rate therefore appreciates. Since the measure of active projects rises gradually over time, the impact effect on the real exchange rate is smaller than the long-run effect, and the RER appreciates gradually over time.
The increase in demand for domestic resources will generate higher income for domestic households. Consumption spending on traded goods and non-traded goods rises on impact.
Since incomes are rising over time and consumers wish to smooth consumption they borrow in foreign bonds, B s , to increase current consumption. The current account therefore goes into deficit for two reasons. One is the increased borrowing by households to smooth consumption and two, the rise in foreign investment flows into the economy. The current account remains in deficit during the entire transition path. The appreciating real exchange rate along-side current account deficits, a consumption boom and rising non-traded sector output and prices is consistent with the empirical evidence for the expansion phase of Latin-American economies 21 . As we argued earlier, this 21 In the data, consumption gradually increasing over time, as opposed to an immediate permanent rise as the model predicts. This follows from the models assumption that (1 + β) r = 1, which generates perfect consumption smoothing. A suitable modification to the model would be to allow for consumer borrowing to depend on current income. Since consumers income is increasing over time, this modification can generate mechanism does not rely on the inter-temporal consumption smoothing behavior of households and explicitly accounts for the current account effects of foreign investment flows.
Asymmetric Responses
In this section we demonstrate that the economy adjusts asymmetrically to symmetric positive and negative shocks to z. In response to an expansionary shock, the real exchange rate appreciates gradually over time. On the other hand it depreciates far more dramatically at the moment of the negative shock and overshoots it long-run level. Similarly, investment flows demonstrate sharp and deeper reversals in the contraction phase as compared to the inflows in the expansion phase.
To demonstrate this we first introduce persistence into the idiosyncratic type of the project. With a probability of λ the idiosyncratic type of the asset remains the same in the next period and with a probability (1−λ) it changes as a random draw from the distribution G(θ).
The solution to the model is now more complicated, as the entire distribution of active project types, m(θ) is now a state variable. Moreover, the distribution m(θ) is discontinuous, as there will be zero mass points for θ < b. We need to solve the model non-linearly. To simplify the solution process, we introduce assumption (5.2) 2223 .
a gradual increase in consumption spending. 22 In the more general case, when assumption 5.2 is not made, the distribution of project types will have to be approximated by a quadrature approximation method. However now the non-linear techniques can run into the curse of dimensionality. 23 This is the same assumption we made in Appendix A.3 to demonstrate the stability of system (.)
analytically.
Assumption (5.2) requires that from the perspective of an individual investor the return from a project is negligibly effected by changes in non-traded goods prices. Recall assumption 2.1 where we assumed additive separability between θ, z and p. We are now additionally restricting the coefficient on p to be small. Each investor purchases only a small fixed amount of the non-traded good (1 unit here), but aggregate demand is large because there are a large number of investors. This simplification will imply that a and b
will only be functions of z and will adjust immediately to their steady state. The logic of the argument for asymmetry can be made compellingly in this framework and we will argue that the results will follow in a model where assumption (5.2) is relaxed.
The asset value of a type θ project now evolves as, (ii) a < b. We will provide the solution for the case (i) and case (ii) follows symmetrically.
Suppose ϕ is sufficiently high so that a > b > 0.
The measure of active projects of type θ in period t will equal the measure of type θ projects in period t − 1 that retain their type in period t and are above the exit cut-off (b t ), λm t−1 (θ) , plus the measure of active projects that realize a new idiosyncratic type and draw θ, (1 − λ)G 0 (θ) R θ * 0 m t (x)dx and the measure of projects of type θ that get newly activated in period (t − 1) if θ ≥ a t , η t F 0 (θ).
The relation between active projects and searchers is then given by,
where
The consumers side of the problem remains unchanged (Section (2.2)). The market clearing condition for non-traded goods prices, p t , is given by
The current account will evolve as (2.2.9) with I t now determined by equation (5.5).
Definition 4 A search equilibrium is a sequence of the household's decisions {C t,t, C n,t , Y n,t , B t+1 }, foreign investors decisions that determine {b t , a t , I t , V t } ,real exchange rate {p t }, the measure of searching investors {η t } and the distribution of active projects {m t (θ)}such that conditions (5.1-5.5), (2.1.2), (2.1.5),(2.1.6) ) and (2.2.5-2.2.7) and (2.2.9) hold, given initial conditions {B 0 , m 0 (θ)} and exogenous state {z t , G (θ) , F (θ)} It should follow without proof that a t , b t , V t are now only functions of aggregate variables z, ϕ and are determined independently of the path of p t. We also obtain a unique long-run equilibrium.
To demonstrate the asymmetry we compare the transition path for an economy that moves from an intial steady state z * to z 1 to one that moves from z * to z 2 where z 1 > z * > z 2 and¯z 1 −z * z * ¯=¯z 2 −z * z * ¯. We refer to z 1 as the 'high' state and to z 2 as the 'low' state 24 . Proposition 5 In equilibrium, a 1 < a * < a 2 and b 1 < b * < b 3 , where a i , b i are the entry and exit cut-offs corresponding to state z i .
Proof. See Appendix A.5
The steady state distribution of active projects in states z i are shown below ( Figure 5 ).
The higher the aggegate state, the less concentrated the distribution of project types as a wider range of idiosyncratic types are acceptable and retained by investors 25 .
The percentage deviation in the real exchange rate is, as before, determined by the change in demand from households and from active projects.
The deviation in the demand for non-traded goods, at the moment of the unanticipated change (t) in z when z changes from z * to z 1 and from z * to z 2 is given by (5.7) and (5.8)
When the economy adjusts from exogenous state z * to z 1 , there is an increase in demand for the non-traded goods that arises from fewer investors exiting their projects and an increase that arises from more matches being accepted. When the economy transitions from z * to z 2 , we observe similar effects with a decline in demand from existing projects 25 See Appendix A. 4 for parameter values that realize new draw types that are now below the exit cut-off and from more draws being rejected and fewer new projects being accepted. In addition, there is a measure λ R b 2 b * m * (θ)dθ of investors whose idiosyncratic type remains unchanged between periods and now exit, resulting in an additional fall in demand for the non-traded good. That is, when the economy corrects to a lower state, it experiences a shut-down of a mass of projects that are no longer viable. A symmetric adjustment is not obseved in the first case because the mass of active projects with type b 1 < θ < b * in the period prior to the shock, is zero ( Figure 5 ). Consequently, if there is sufficient persistence, the effect of a negative impact on z results in a sharper downward correction in the real exchange rate at the moment of the shock, as compared to the appreciation at the moment of the positive shock. Mortenson-Pissarides (1994) identify this asymmetry in the case of job flows, when workers and vacancies match via a matching technology to create jobs. The presence of a search friction therefore generates this asymmetry naturally. The particular nature of the asymmetry in our framework, with a gradually appreciating real exchange rate in the expansion phase and overshooting in the correction phase is specific to our application.
Since, a and b adjust immediately to their new steady state, from period (t + 1) onwards the term λ R b 2 b * m * (θ)dθ will be zero. Figure 6A and 6B demonstrates the asymmetry. Net investment flows (and therefore the current account) also respond asymmetrically, with reversals in net investment flows at the moment of the shock being sharper and more dramatic than the increase in net investment flows that follows a positive shock. In relating this to the experience of emerging market economies, it may be more suitable to consider a two state Markov process for z, as z switches between z 1 and z 2 . The asymmetry we describe will imply periods of gradual expansion alternating with sharp reversals.
The anticipation of the change in state will imply a convergence of b 1 and b 2 , however b 1 < b 2 will always hold and therefore the asymmetry argument will still go through. We do not consider a stochastic process in z for reasons spelt out earlier and also because the argument can be made without it.
If we were to relax assumption 5.1, the asymmetry at the moment of the shock still holds. The difference now is that the fall (rise) in a and b at the moment of the shock will be lower (lower) because of the effect of rising (falling) resource costs. However, this effect will not overwhelm the primary effect arising from a change in z. (This is seen in Figure 3 where changes in prices effect the cut-offs but the effect of a change in z is not overwhelmed. It should be clear that the adjustment paths differ from what we would have obtained had we used a quadratic adjustment cost investment model. The mechanism that generates this asymmetry is also very different from the 'occasionally binding credit constraint' mechanism described in the literature.
Conclusion
The role of information imperfections in investing in emerging markets is considerable.
The existing literature on the theoretical and empirical aspects of this friction is however receives foreign investment flows that is subject to a natural friction, a search friction, will experience a propagation of shocks that resembles the experience of several emerging markets. Appreciations in the real exchange rate will be slow and gradual in the expansion phase, depreciations will be dramatically sharper in the correction phase. Similarly, current accounts reverse more sharply in a downturn. Symmetric changes in fundamentals will have asymmetric effects on the economy.
In determining the behavior of the current account we have combined the dynamics that arise from the inter-temporal consumption smoothing mechanism with the behavior of return seeking capital flows. The behavior of the latter is modeled as a micro-foundation based adjustment hazard model of investment and is shown to differ significantly from a standard q model. We would also argue for an empirical approach that focuses on both the gross patterns and net patterns in foriegn investment flows as opposed to only the latter, as it helps us understand the specific response of net investments.
Appendix
Appendix A.1: Proof for Proposition 2
The equilibrium solution can be reduced to a triplet {a, b, p} that is determined by the following equations.
is continuous and strictly increasing
Proof. The continuity of the function follows from assumption 2.1. Applying integration by parts to equation (2.1.3) we obtain an expression for the asset value R(θ; z, p). Since we will focus on interior equilibria when a, b ∈ (0, θ * ), we can combine the entry (2.1.5) and exit (2.1.2) conditions with the value function (2.1.6) to obtain the following relation
It follows from assumption 2.1(i) that equation (A.1.1) is independent of p and z. This is because the resources employed by the project is independent of type θ. Simple differentiation of the preceding relation then implies that in steady state equilibrium
Lemma 7 Define p 1 (a) as the relative price of non-traded goods (and real exchange rate) such that the exit condition is satisfied, i.e.,
is continuous and strictly increasing.
Proof. This relation implies that when resource costs, p, are high the asset value of a project falls and investors become more selective of their investments, i.e. a is higher. The exit condition can be re-expressed as
It follows from Lemma 3 that b a = F (a). Therefore (−1 + δ(1 − G(b))b a ) < 0. From assumption 2.1(ii), we have π p < 0. 
where we have substituted the intra-temporal optimization condition for traded-non-traded goods consumption and the optimal supply of non-traded goods condition. Also, for the measure of active projects to stay constant over time, steady state investment has to be zero.
In steady state m = 
by the condition that C t = rB +Ȳ t + pm. When combined with the output supply and non-traded goods price condition, we require that rB +Ȳ t > 0 for p > 0 in equilibrium. p 0 2 (a) < 0 implies that when investors are more selective, the measure of active projects fall and accordingly the demand for non-traded goods resulting in a fall in non-traded goods prices.
Proposition 1: There exists a unique steady state equilibrium with endogenous entry,
Proof. We must show that there exists a uniqueā such that p 2 (ā) = p 1 (ā) . This follows immediately from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 . p 2 (ā) is a strictly negative sloping relation between p and a. p 1 (a) provides a strictly positive sloping relation between p and a. The intersection point of these two curves is necessarily unique. The unique value of b is then determined from the relation between a and b in Lemma 6. ) and a rightward shift of p 2 (a). a is unambiguously higher. The effect on p is ambiguous.
Appendix A.3
The case we discuss here, employs the restriction that π p = 0. That is, that changes in non-traded goods prices have a negligible effect on the return to an investor. The per period return to the investor is π (θ; z t , p t ) . If θ and z are sufficiently high compared to p, then changes in p will have a negligible effect on the entry and exit cut-off. If we take this to the extreme and assumer π p = 0, then the dynamic solution is simplified, as now we can solve the dynamic solution for the investor independent from the consumers decisions 27 .
The latter will clearly continue to depend on the former.
The return from a type θ asset (2.1.1) can be expressed as
The log-linearized equations for the entry cut-off (2.1.5), exit cut-off (2.1.2) and value function (2.1.6) are then
The evolution of the measure of incumbents
Withπ p = 0, this system can be reduced to a system
The system of dynamic equations in (A. We can now derive the impulse response to a permanent change in z at time t. On impact, a t , b t and V t adjust immediately to their long-run level. A permanently higher z will correspond to a permanently lower a and b. Investment and the measure of incumbents adjust gradually over time because of the search mechanism.
dI t+k =m ( b m t+k+1 − b m t+k ) (A.3.8)
The last equality follows from expression (A.3.8).
In response to an unanticipated permanent increase in z, investment in shown to necessarily increase and then decline over the transition path as it approaches its long-run level of zero. The measure of active projects increases monotonically over time. To determine the effect on the real exchange rate, we have to solve for the dynamic problem of consumers.
We can solve for the sub-system for the consumers decisions as Γ t+1 =Σ eΓt + e ΩΠ t (A. We solve for this sub-system as a function of the changes in investment, dI t and predetermined active projects,m tt . This sub-system has a unique bounded solution, with eigenvalues λ 4 = 1, λ 5 = 1 + r > 1. λ 5 is the unstable root and λ 4 is the stable root. Define This is then solved as The preceding equations demonstrate that the real exchange rate rises on impact, but just not adjust immediately to its long-run level. Instead it appreciates gradually over time, as more matches get accepted and the pool of active projects grows over time.
Appendix A.4: The parameters we employ in the numerical simulation for Figure 3 
